Wydanie/Ausgabe 131/04.04.2024

              It is now the beginning of the third month of the Russian Federation's war with Ukraine. War in the full sense of the word, although Moscow calls it a special operation in political terms to rid Ukraine of Nazi elements.     Of course, Ukraine is not completely free from Nazism, one of the leading forces in this country, the Right Sector fully continues in political practice the program that Stefan Bandera began in the 1920s in Ukraine. A very vassal character with Hitler and the NSDAP. This must not be forgotten, as well as the fact that the Ukrainian fascists under the banner of Bandera cruelly and brutally murdered about 200,000 people in Volhynia and part of Polish Podolia. Only because they were Poles.  

Today, mołojcy from the Ukrainian voluntary regiment Azov, who are besieged in the Mariupol steelworks, are shouting to the whole world for rescue, not remembering that yesterday, as hooligans mainly of the Metalist Kharkiv club, they called for the march to Kursk, Voronezh, Moscow but also Lublin and Krakow. the views on the necessity to build 'Greater Ukraine' still prevail, at the expense of Russia, of course, but also of Poland, Slovakia and Hungary.[2] So much for a more ideological issue. But politically, the Russian Federation is the aggressor and aggressor in the light of international law. Russian soldiers, using the stronger law, murder and rob in eastern and central Ukraine.  The political situation is very complex Ukrainian politicians, led by President Zelensky, have been testing Putin for a long time in their own way. The test consisted in how much free political maneuver Ukraine could afford. quickly become a member of both NATO and the European Union. Of course, a significant part of the Ukrainian establishment reasoning in a simplified manner. These politicians think that Ukraine just deserves membership in these organizations, of course, along with all possible privileges flowing from herds. Because Ukrainian politicians do not think about the obvious obligations towards these organizations at all. Meanwhile, the matter is not so simple, because each country has to go its long way to the EU as well as to NATO, it must simply, in the process of convergence, adapt its political system as well as economic and social structures to potential membership in both of these very important organizations. Today it is clearly visible that in the foreseeable real reality the road to NATO is simply closed and to the European Union, if at all, it will be very long and bumpy.[3]  Here, attention must also be paid to the fact that Ukrainian politicians, but also Ukrainian public opinion, was largely led astray. By some Western politicians who also wanted to test Russia to what extent it would politically allow Ukraine to geopolitically move to a political camp opposing Russia.  Here, the greatest blame lies with the typical political loser, Boris Johnson, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, who is threatened with dismissal from the post of prime minister even by his own parties, and Joe Biden, who is very weak in terms of content and politics. These politicians, and behind them, of course, the right-wing nationalist team currently in power in Poland, assured the Ukrainian authorities that now is the best time for them to play on Moscow's nose and completely free themselves from any influence of the Russian Federation. disintegrate the Russian state into at least a few smaller ones. These are the suggestions that Pope Francis called 'NATO barking at the gates of Moscow.[4]

               Of course, many countries, and even more Western politicians, would like it very much if Russia collapsed, but it is absolutely not likely. There was a moment during the presidency of B. Yeltsin where Russia began to wobble as a state.[5] Economic communication between several parts of it was broken, Even the Siberian oil railroad stopped running on the entire route between Moscow and Vladivostok as a result of track failure.[6] But it was then that Russian elites and oligarchs reached for W. Putin, who effectively centralized the Federation and restored the state's unitarity. And today it must be clearly said that California, Oregon, Nevada and the other western states will separate from Washington than Russia collapses.  

             The course of the war, however, does not necessarily go as Russia intended. In the Kremlin salons it was imagined that this war would be a kind of punitive expedition to Ukraine. The Russian troops were to take Kyiv and several other centers of Ukraine in rapid raids. Then a new government would be created in favor of Russia and it would be practically after the problem.  Therefore, contrary to all the rules of the art of war, the Russian military columns moved from as many as seven completely different directions without a specific center of gravity, which is required by the basic principles of the art of operation.  Hence, it was relatively easy for the Ukrainian troops to attack the excessively stretched columns of Russian troops and Russian military logistics that were on the march. Another premise that was negative for Russia was revealed: the armed forces of this country amount to 1,250 million people in peacetime, but the land forces are Only 295,000. The number of soldiers of the Russian Federation serves in a very complex anti-air and anti-missile system, also in terms of personnel. Moreover, the selection of suitability for service in the land forces is poor. Another negative aspect is that while in various other types of troops about 70 percent are professional and contract soldiers, it is only 45 percent in land troops, because a significant part of the selection takes place also in the perspective of other types of troops. Of course, not to the navy. and some air forces. The herd in the land forces there are relatively many ordinary, practically compulsory conscripts, who do not associate their life prospects with professional or contractual military service.  For example, in a three-man crew of a tank, a mechanic driver is a conscript soldier. He should go into battle after at least six months of training and passing an armored vehicle driving test in the field. One of the tasks is also to conduct further training of the driver. Mechanized infantry, in turn, at the team level is a kind of mixture of professionalism, but also recruiting. It can be assumed that in a 9-person team that jumps out of the BTR or IFV and develops into a mini tyralierka, two or four soldiers are professionals. But the rest are poorly trained and often very scared 18-19 year old conscripts. It does not help here that all of them are armed with the very modern AKM y-74 caliber 5.45 with grenade launchers, 40 mm. Because a modern weapon alone doesn't do anything.


              The Russians suffered a kind of defeat near Kiev, because the approximately 70,000 army that entered Ukraine in the first wave was prepared only for a kind of military walk. And the Ukrainians, who by no means sinned by excessive organization, quickly realized that the Russian supply columns were simply rows of cars, practically without an escort. The disasters in the military sense also happened to the Russians in other operational directions.  Of course, the Russian air force wiped out the Ukrainian air armada from the Ukrainian skies within three days. There could be no surprise here. Because the Russians and Ukrainians use basically the same types of machines based on the MIG-25 and SU-27 constructions. But the Ukrainian machines are early designs, the latest of which are about 30 years old. The technical condition of these Ukrainian machines leaves much to be desired. In this part of the Ukrainian armed forces, technical cannibalism is simply taking place. We simply translate whole modules from one camera to another. Also, Ukrainian pilots do not fly, so their level of training leaves much to be desired.[7]   But, in turn, Ukraine received huge supplies of military equipment from NATO countries, including anti-aircraft kits. And that of the newest generations. This makes it much more difficult for the Russian air force to operate freely in the airspace of Ukraine.   When it comes to armored and mechanized equipment, both sides also use the same or very similar equipment. It turns out that Ukraine has only a small number of tanks. The Soviet T-64 and T-80 modernized by them for machines with noisy names. Oplot and Bułat turn out to be rather unsuccessful constructions. But there are very few on the front of these machines. It is simply confirmed that what was disclosed in confidence, namely that Ukraine sells its tanks and transporters in large numbers, to every, even formally forbidden customer. The Russians, however, did not surprise anything in terms of the used equipment. The basic tank used in combat on the Russian side is the deeply modernized T-72 in the T-72-B3 version. This armored vehicle, however, suffers very large losses at the front. Even several thousand armor-piercing sets of the Jawelin class. These easy-to-use and very effective missiles explode most often when flying over a very poorly armored turret from above. There has already been information that in response the Russians are starting to use old T-55 class tanks downloaded from maintenance. old constructions but still very mobile. In addition, the cast steel turret withstands an explosion above it much more than the newer T-72 machines. 

             After the defeats suffered near Kiev, Chernihiv and several other places, the Russian staffs had to think of their usual mind. The second stage of the Russian offensive looks completely different. The Russians have concentrated their forces in the south, where they have already successfully achieved success. Odessa to cut off Ukraine completely from the sea. Perhaps they will want to go further and join the contingent of their troops stationed in Nadniestrze. By the way, of course, they will take over this, in fact, not very large area. But the main Russian strike of the second phase of the operation is a circling maneuver in a typical classic Kanna style in Donbas. There, a much stronger one, because a total of about 160,000 Russian army strikes for half a night from the not-yet-captured area of ​​Kharkiv towards the southwest and from the south from the region of Chersoń to the northeast. At present, the Russian troops are already being heavily reinforced. The land forces performing the operation "Ukraine" were joined by five brigades of marines, which are not subject to the normal structures of the land forces. Three independent regiments of sea special forces were also added. The Russian troops were also joined by two regiments of Kadyrov's Chechens and one regiment of Dagestanians. Two battalions were added to this. Russian mercenaries from the so-called Wagner's groups and, at present, two more battalions of Syrian mercenaries and also two Libyan mercenaries. There is also probably an incomplete battalion of Cuban volunteers at the disposal of Russia. There may also be smaller units of volunteers from Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. There are also signals that a volunteer regiment from Belarus and representatives of the Russian minority from Latvia and Estonia are fighting on the Russian side.               These are very serious reinforcements. Nevertheless, almost half of the Russian troops are still poorly trained and quite cowardly conscripts. Nevertheless, despite individual signals about the lack of equipment and equipment, it is a well-equipped army. uniformly and well commanded. The entire operation was commanded by General Dvornikov, commander of the Southern Military District, who has had a very effective command practice in Syria. 

             Paradoxically, more soldiers are fighting on the side of Ukraine than on the Russian side. Theoretically, it is even three hundred thousand soldiers. But only about 110,000 are generally well-trained soldiers of operational forces. The remaining ones are the territorial defense forces and various sub-units of nationalists and so-called volunteers under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Sometimes the latter are more trouble than good. nationalists such as the Azov regiment pursue their political goals, sometimes without any concern for strategic and operational problems. At the moment, the basic grouping of Ukrainian troops is deployed in Donbas. In the area of ​​the city of Slavyansk. A decisive battle will be fought here, because the Russian troops are slowly but effectively approaching this city, occupying other towns in heavy fights. The Ukrainians are very much counting on their fortifications made in a few years after 2014, and they are often solid concrete combat bunkers. Nevertheless, strong Russian artillery is successively chasing through these fortifications, paving the way for their assault groups.[8]               For natural reasons, the question must be asked how this very bloody war is to continue. In a political sense, Russia will strive to conquer and take over eastern and southern Ukraine. More or less to the Dnieper line and in the south it will want to occupy the Zaporizhia and Odessa oblasts. It is a question about a kind of political fate of Transnistria. If the Russians occupy the Odessa district, they will gain a direct land connection with the narrow but strategically very important area of ​​the Dniester River. Here, it is unlikely that, as President Zelenskiy is frightened, they would want to occupy the entirety of Moldova, but the aforementioned Transnistria, of course, would. Especially that in this region, support for a union with Russia is practically unequivocal. Is Russia annexing the occupied territories? Probably in the future, yes. But for today it will probably create, following the example of Donetsk and Lugansk, People's Republics, other quasi-state entities of this type. Therefore, we can witness the establishment of the Kherson, Zaporizhia and Odessa republics. Perhaps one or two more. The next question is whether these republics will form a kind of New Russian Federation. And it is very likely. Then it will be easier for Moscow to control this territorial creation and lead to a successive annexation to its territory. One of the last questions is whether there are threats to the world's relatively stable peace. Today, quite paradoxically, such a question mark is the fate of the Crimean bridge, i.e. the structure connecting the territory of Crimea with the center of the Russian state. it makes the slightest sense because the Russian Federation has already obtained a direct land connection with Crimea. However, the matter of prestige remains. If Ukrainians strike the bridge, Russia will of course respond with nuclear strikes at about 10-12 targets in Ukraine. Including Kiev, of course. These will be low-power strikes, but they will be nuclear strikes. And then there is a big problem what to do next.  Russia will not win the great conventional war with NATO, but it can achieve strategic success in a nuclear war. The country has about 5,500 thousand nuclear warheads. Probably about three thousand more. The question remains, what is the state of the Russian means of carrying these warheads at the moment. Here we can only estimate and guess. Russia has no more than ten of the newest Sarmat-class heavy missiles at the moment. One can clearly see the feverish work of the rocket industry on the production of this already tested rocket. large rockets is a complicated activity, so these missiles can arrive at a rate of two to three a month. The more so that the underground and overall dimensions of the older SS-18 Wojewoda / Satan missiles are of course adapted to the Sarmat missiles, but the entire equipment requires extensive replacement and modernization. It takes time, but also requires time. The next question is how many SS-18 missiles are still in combat readiness. Here, without further deliberation, it can be said that at least seventy. Of course, there is another problem whether these missiles built in the seventies of the twentieth century with long operational ballistic flight will break through the US anti-missile system. But this system is not tight at all. The Russian system based on the S-400 missiles, and to a small extent also on the S-500, is much more efficient. We know that in November-December 2021, Russia ordered about two or three hundred new Lajner-class missiles. This missile is, next to the older generation Siniewa missile, the armament of the Russian Delta III and Delta IV-class submarines. But it is a very efficient and dangerous rocket, of course multi-head, fired with liquid fuel, which can also be placed in underground silos. Here, it should be assumed that about fifty of these missiles have already been placed on the launch stands. They are probably to remain there until they are replaced by much larger and more dangerous Sarmatians. In a word, the Russian Federation is also preparing for the gloomy alternative that could be a general nuclear war. It is all the more likely that the Russians have already put two more boomers, i.e. nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles, into the line. These are Borej A class ships armed with multi-head ballistic missiles fired with solid fuel of the Bulawa type. It is also likely that the shipyard in Konsomolsk-on-Amur started the construction of four significantly modified Kilo-class submarines a few months ago. These ships are to be a big novelty, adapted not only to firing the Kalibr circulating missiles, but also six Bulawa missiles from the vertical position. The war in Ukraine continues. Will it be just a large-scale local conflict or will it turn into a vaguely crawling global conflict, the coming weeks will show.

[1] AUTHOR; Colonel / r / dr. Academic lecturer. Member of the Polish Parliament for the second term of office

[2] W .Kowalski. Walka dyplomatyczno -polityczna o miejsce Polski w Europie w latach 1944-1945.Ki W .Warszawa.1974.s.58 i nast.. Por .S .Zabiello .O rząd i granice .Pax Warszawa.1954.s.41-45

[3] Z .Brzezinski. Wielka szachownica. Zysk i ska .Poznan.2004.s.114-117

[4] Corierre de la serra.05.05.2022

[5] Gorbaczow .Pierisrojka i nowe myslenie. KiW.Warszawa.2003.s.78 i nast.

[6] E .Januła. Kolej transsyberyjska .Nerw systemu Rosji./w/ Transport i komunikacja. Nr.4/2005

[7] Eugeniuisz  Janula .Armia Ukrainy/w/ http.www .Geopolityka. org.Dostęp.05.05.2022

[8] E  .Janula .Jak Putin zajął Krym/whttp .www./Geopolityka .org. Dostęp.05.05.2021